Tähdistö writer Matilde Torta examines how Europe’s intensifying crackdown on migration operates on two interconnected fronts. Taking Denmark as a case study, she traces how domestic housing legislation targeting ”non-Western” residents has been challenged before the CJEU as racially discriminatory, while simultaneously Denmark has championed the externalisation of asylum processing beyond EU borders. Connecting this to the European Parliament’s March 2026 approval of a Return Regulation enabling offshore deportation hubs, she argues that measures framed around integration and social cohesion increasingly risk deepening ethno-racial exclusion, even when advanced by self-described progressive or moderate governments.
Never before has migration dominated Europe’s political agenda as it does today. Across Europe, migration has become an increasingly contentious issue, with public and political debate often centering on questions of security, integration, and national identity. In this context, the term “remigration,” originating in far-right nationalist discourse to describe the reversal of migration through the expulsion of minority populations, often non-white asylum seekers or refugees, has begun dominating mainstream political vocabulary.
Studies across several EU countries indicate that migrants are overrepresented in prisons and recorded as committing crimes at higher rates per capita than natives, a pattern partly explained by demographic factors (young males), lower educational attainment, and greater poverty exposure. However, no definitive conclusion can be drawn about the relationship between migration influxes and criminality rates, or whether immigration directly increases overall crime rates in communities. Indeed, rates have declined or remained stable despite the rising influx of migrants. This suggests that socio-economic conditions (e.g., irregularity, job barriers, poverty) are the key drivers of this disparity rather than immigration itself. Accordingly, while raw data show higher average migrant criminality, contextual socio-economic factors must be accounted for before drawing any causal conclusions.
Many EU Member States have adopted stricter migration policies both to regulate influxes (and pushbacks) and to govern migrants already living in their territories. Denmark is a striking example. Interestingly, it is the left-wing government, and not the (far) right parties, that has pushed for what is now one of the strictest policies across the EU. This tightening began with the 2015 refugee crisis, where concern arose about migrants over-benefitting from the famous Danish welfare system, to the detriment of Danish nationals.
On the one hand, internally, through highly debated housing laws, Denmark has prioritized the “gentrification” of socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods, measured by unemployment rates, educational attainment, criminal convictions, and average gross income. This was premised on combating “parallel societies”, allegedly a threat to national cohesion. Among these, those in which at least fifty percent of residents are classified as “immigrants and their descendants from non-Western countries”, including both Danish nationals and non-nationals, are then classified as “transformation areas” (previous name was “hard ghetto areas”) and are, thus, logically the only ones subjected to these “gentrification” measures, which notably include lease termination and forced relocation.
Recently, these laws were at the core of a preliminary ruling (C-417/23) before the CJEU, assessing their compatibility with the Race Equality Directive, in particular asking whether this classification of “non-Western immigrants and their descendants” constitutes a distinction based on ethnic origin under the Race Equality Directive, and if so, whether it gives rise to direct or indirect discrimination.
In a bold Opinion, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta concluded that the distinction is indeed based on ethnic origin and constitutes direct discrimination. She relied on previous case law (CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, C‑83/14; Feryn, C‑54/07) to adopt a functional interpretation of ethnic origin, namely a concept rooted in ancestry, geographical origin and perceived cultural difference, contrary to the mere statistical classification advanced by the Danish government.
The CJEU, without substantially disagreeing, was more cautious and deferential than the Advocate General. It first held that the legislation is capable of falling within the scope of the Directive, by interpreting ethnic origin, which is not defined per se in the Directive, as stemming from a combination of characteristics (such as nationality, religion, language, cultural and traditional background) that are both objective and subjective in nature. The Court also clarified that discrimination may be based on a broad category, even if it encompasses multiple ethnicities, so long as it reproduces disadvantage “on the grounds of ethnic origin”. However, the CJEU then left the assessment to the national court, emphasising that if it does not found direct discrimination, it shall still consider whether the legislation is indirectly discriminatory and, if so, whether it is justified by social cohesion and integration (overriding reasons of public interests), if done in a necessary, appropriate and proportionate way, by respecting, at the same time, fundamental rights. If not, the national court will have to disapply the law, possibly urging the Danish legislator to amend it in line with EU standards, in particular as set out in the Race Equality Directive.
On the other hand, Denmark has increasingly adopted measures to restrict access for both asylum-seekers and economic migrants seeking to work there. Today, it has become one of the loudest proponents for processing undocumented asylum seekers and other migrants outside the continent. It has even considered detaining them on a Danish island previously used as a centre for contagious animals. In 2021, a law was passed enabling the outsourcing of asylum processing to partner countries, with Rwanda mooted as a potential partner. Other countries have then followed its example.
It is therefore unsurprising that in March 2026, the European Parliament approved a Return Regulation that allows Member States to build deportation centres, referred to as “return hubs”, outside the EU. This is seen as key to raising return rates of undocumented migrants, including those who have overstayed their visa and those who have been denied asylum. Many see it as the base of a new push to crack down on irregular migration, which is increasingly on the rise, with only about one in five people under a return order being deported to their country of origin, Brussels officials say. It is meant to ensure a more effective and stricter system for returns, asylum procedures, and entry prevention. At the same time, it has been criticised for a lack of human rights safeguards, effectively rendering it a “deportation regulation”, one that fails to address the structural drivers of irregular migration that outsourcing procedures to non-EU countries cannot resolve.
The law would enable Member States to send irregular migrants to third countries not linked to their origin, as long as they have bilateral deals to build “return hubs” there, namely offshore centres where deported people would be held while awaiting return to their home country. The law also increases the maximum legal detention time to two years and imposes practically unlimited entry bans on people sent back.
The law was supported by 389 MEPs, with 206 against and 32 abstentions. After the vote, much of the hemicycle broke into applause and cheers. In the vote, the European People’s Party (EPP) joined far-right groups to pass it. Only a few EPP MEPs from Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, and Finland voted no or abstained.
“We will impose a simple principle: who comes to Europe illegally cannot stay”, French EPP MEP Francois-Xavier Bellamy wrote on X. Charlie Weimers, a Swedish MEP involved in negotiating the text, said: “The era of deportations has begun […] the vote confirms a growing and stable majority in favor of more effective returns […]. A functioning migration system must ensure that those who [have] no legal right to stay are effectively returned.”
Leftist groups voted against, worried about fundamental rights. In fact, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights had already recently spoken against creating “human rights black holes” at return hubs. There are concerns about the provision of human rights safeguards in non-EU countries, which, in turn, undermine the legitimacy and public acceptance of the return policy. Additionally, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) expressed concerns regarding the vote, which it referred to as “a historic setback for refugee rights”, paving the way towards a new punitive EU asylum and migration regime, designed to deter, detain and deport people seeking safety.
“This is no longer about returning people, but sending them virtually to any country in the world, maybe one that they have never seen before,” said MEP Cecilia Strada from Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Mélissa Camara, a French Green MEP who voted against, referred to the vote as shameful, which potentially also gives the green light to the detention of children, sometimes without even real legal grounds. “History will remember that the so-called moderate right-wing group sounded the death knell of what remained of the cordon sanitaire,” she added.
However, Danish, Maltese, and Latvian S&D MEPs voted in favor, aligning with their governments’ policies. Nordic and German MEPs from Renew Europe did too. They have already been working with Greece, Austria and the Netherlands to establish return hubs outside the EU, which would be used for those denied asylum, but not for people who only wish to make a request, unlike the abandoned plan between the UK and Rwanda.
While migration has never been as central to Europe’s political agenda as it is today, the current push towards stricter return and settlement‑related measures feels less like a neutral technical fix and more like a politically loaded shift, stemming from the hardening of migration discourses in the European Parliament and Council, growing alliances between mainstream centre‑right and far‑right groups, and a broader move toward securitized, enforcement‑heavy policies in the EU’s latest asylum reforms. The Danish case and the recent EU Return Regulation show how measures framed in terms of “integration” or “social cohesion” can still deepen ethno-racial divides and expand exclusion, even when backed by governments that call themselves progressive or moderate. Given this, it seems crucial to couple any tougher return framework with robust human rights safeguards and independent monitoring of offshore hubs, so that deterrence and deportation do not quietly become the default response.